Framing Interethnic Ideology: Effects of Multicultural and Color-Blind Perspectives on Judgments of Groups and Individuals

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In 3 experiments, White American college students received a message advocating either a color-blind or a multicultural ideological approach to improving interethnic relations and then made judgments about various ethnic groups and individuals. Relative to a color-blind perspective, the multicultural perspective led to stronger stereotypes, greater accuracy in these stereotypes, and greater use of category information in judgments of individuals. This increase in between-category differentiation occurred both for attributes that favored the in-group and for attributes that favored the out-group and was also paired in some cases with greater overall positivity toward the out-group. The findings lead us to question the implicit assumption driving the majority of social psychological efforts at prejudice reduction: that the categorization process leads to prejudice, and that the relevance of social categories must therefore be de-emphasized.

The historical idea of a unifying American identity is now in peril. . . . Instead of a transformative nation with an identity all its own, America in this new light is seen as preservative of diverse alien identities. . . . The multiethnic dogma abandons historical purpose, replacing assimilation by fragmentation, integration by separatism. It belittles unum and glorifies pluribus. . . . One wonders: Will the center hold? Or will the melting pot give way to the Tower of Babel. (Schlesinger, 1992, pp. 16–18)

Ethnic lines will not disappear in the foreseeable future. In many parts of the world strong forces are drawing those lines more sharply. Ethnic groups in conflict mutually reinforce their antagonistic identities. In the midst of collapsing states and empires, old dreams of their own nation-state become vivid for many long-suffering ethnic minorities. In less conflictual settings, the continuing need for a more personal identity in a culturally complex and rapidly changing world persists. . . . At this period in history, it is not a matter of assimilation versus ethnicity, but of assimilation and ethnicity. (Yinger, 1994, p. 343)

The words of these theorists speak to one of the greatest challenges to be faced in our world today: how to achieve the peaceful and mutually satisfactory coexistence of diverse cultural and eth-

nic groups, each one possessing a more or less different construal of social reality resulting from collectively shared historical, political, and economic experiences. There is hardly an agreed-upon solution to this "problem" of diversity. Schlesinger's (1992) ideas have strong assimilationist implications, questioning even the rationality or sanity of maintaining ethnic identity in a modern world, while Yinger (1994) highlights what he considers to be the reality of cultural differences and the need for a simultaneous preservation of ethnic identity and identification of common ground. Does accentuating ethnic group differences inevitably lead to greater prejudice and conflict? Must diverse groups suppress their ethnic heritage in order to form a cohesive, harmonious nation?

As a nation comprised of diverse immigrants, both forced and voluntary, inhabitants of the United States have always had to confront issues surrounding racism and ethnic diversity. In recent history, the atrocities perpetrated in the second World War marked an especially powerful challenge to democracy in America. Prominent social scientists of this era, such as Montagu (1942), Benedict (1943), and Myrdal (1944), denounced the doctrines of racial superiority in fascist and Nazi ideology and argued that American society needed to seriously confront its own problems of racism in order to live up to its democratic ideal and in order to serve as an honorable proponent for equality worldwide.

In the wake of World War II, the latter half of this century has, to some extent, seen a marked reduction in the practice of explicit racial prejudice. On the political level, the Civil Rights Movement helped to achieve significant successes, including the prohibition of discrimination in public accommodations and employment (Takaki, 1993). The attitudes of the dominant White majority have also undergone some revision. For example, over the past several decades, a number of empirical findings within the sociological and social psychological literatures have revealed a decline in White Americans' explicit expression of prejudice towards Black Americans (Devine & Elliot, 1995; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986,

1991; Gilbert, 1951; Karlins, Coffman, & Walters, 1969; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997; Sigall & Page, 1971). Although these trends appear encouraging, we only need compare the expression of anger and frustration in the Watts riot of 1965 to that in the Rodney King riot of 1992 to understand that the inseparable forces of racial and economic injustice still pervade our society in the late 20th century.

Adding to the interethnic conflict that has always been with us, in the past decade we have seen a heightened awareness of the increasing level of ethnic diversity within the United States. Some estimate that by the middle of the next century the majority of Americans will trace their origins to almost anywhere but White Europe (Henry, 1990). Recognition of these changing demographics has led to a fierce ideological debate over what it means to be an American and over how we may best achieve a truly democratic society. The debate is perhaps best exemplified in the opposing strategies adopted in recent work toward educational reform in this country. On the one hand, many scholars have argued that in an increasingly complex world we must strive harder than ever to live up to our creed of e pluribus unum, by transmitting a common core of (predominantly Eurocentric) knowledge in our educational systems (e.g., Bennett, 1987; Bloom, 1987; Finn, 1991; Hirsch, 1996; Schlesinger, 1992). In short, the argument is that we must work towards a color-blind ideal, assimilating the diverse elements of our social heritage into the American "melting pot." This perspective fervently objects to the development of bilingual and multicultural educational initiatives, arguing that such culturally relativistic programs lead to the disunification of the United States.

In contrast to the color-blind agenda, many others have argued that the path toward achieving a strong and harmonious American society should be one in which we better recognize and appreciate our diversity (e.g., Takaki, 1993; Yinger, 1994). Educational reformers who adopt such a multicultural perspective suggest that the monocultural alternative, founded in Eurocentric intellectual traditions, fails to provide all students with a true sense of their cultural heritage (Nieto, 1996; Sleeter & McLaren, 1995). This approach highlights the historical experiences of diverse ethnic and cultural groups and challenges the White-dominated power structure that has often explained the educational failure of minority children as being due to their inherent ineptitude (Cummins, 1989; Skutnabb-Kangas & Cummins, 1988; Weis, 1988).

This somewhat simplified characterization of educational efforts that address ethnic diversity mirrors a similar tension in the social psychological literature on intergroup relations. This research rarely contains the political arguments often present in the educational realm, but it does approach the issue of how to best ameliorate prejudice from the same two basic perspectives—a color-blind perspective that stresses the importance of breaking down social categories and judging one another as individuals and a multicultural perspective that emphasizes the importance of appreciating group differences. The present article examines the influences that these two contrasting approaches have on intergroup perceptions.

Most theorizing in social psychology has approached the issue of prejudice reduction from what is essentially a color-blind perspective, where emphasis is placed on treating each person as a unique individual, as opposed to an interchangeable member of a social category. The origins of this approach toward ameliorating prejudice can be traced in large part to the influential work of

Tajfel (1969, 1970), who argued that intergroup bias is a direct result of the categorization process—that the mere existence of different groups is sufficient to foster biased behavior. In support of this contention, results from many experiments have shown that even very simple, artificial manipulations of group membership (often based on trivial criteria) can lead to significant evaluative biases (for reviews see Brewer, 1979; Diehl, 1990; Wilder, 1986).

Stimulated by the notion that mere in-group/out-group categorization is sufficient to create intergroup bias, social psychological efforts at prejudice reduction have focused on inhibiting or altering the categorization process. For example, in their work on examining the effectiveness of intergroup contact interventions, Brewer and Miller (1984, 1988) focus on the importance of individuation, or personalization, in fostering more positive attitudes. In their words, "the contact situation must be designed to eliminate or overcome the features that promote category salience" (1988, p. 320). It is argued that negative predispositions towards out-group members are due largely to an overreliance on the use of stereotypes in social interaction, and that by encouraging decategorization through personalization, we may begin to overcome this tendency. Operating under this framework, cooperative, interpersonal interactions between group members have resulted in more positive intergroup attitudes in a number of experiments (Bettencourt, Brewer, Rogers-Croak, & Miller, 1992; Cook, 1984; Miller, Brewer, & Edwards, 1985).

From a similar perspective, Gaertner, Dovidio, and their colleagues have argued that the key to reducing prejudice is to restructure the way social categories are applied by establishing a common in-group identity ("we"), rather than "us" versus "them" (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993). Typically, this research has found that the most positive intergroup attitudes are obtained when the contact situation involves cooperative interdependence and is defined as one in which the participants comprise one single group, as opposed to individuals or different groups (see also Sherif, 1966; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). In sum, much of the research on prejudice reduction in social psychology operates under the assumption that the formation of social categories is sufficient to create prejudice, and, therefore, that the reduction of such bias can be achieved through techniques that alter the in-group/out-group categorization.

In contrast to this dominant approach, a few researchers have focused instead on the importance of recognizing different group realities. The basic starting point for this multicultural perspective is that groups of people differ in their subjective culture—that based on their shared historical, political, and economic experiences, groups of people naturally vary in their ways of interpreting and behaving in their respective social environments. The significant role that subjective culture plays in helping us to understand intergroup relations is well expressed by Triandis (1988): "One of the realities of different subjective cultures is that they result in different expectations and different perceptions of the antecedents or consequences of interactions. Thus, the greater the heterogeneity within a given society, the greater probability that interactions will be costly" (p. 33). The goal in this approach, then, is to reduce the conflicts resulting from intergroup interactions through greater awareness and understanding of differential group experiences.

This perspective is evident in the integrative work of anthropologists and psychologists on enhancing the effectiveness of and

understanding in cross-cultural communications. One major strategy for reducing ignorance has involved the use of various forms of cross-cultural training programs or *cultural assimilators* (for examples, see Bennett, 1986; Brislin & Pedersen, 1976; Cushner & Brislin, 1995; Fielder, Mitchell, & Triandis, 1971; Triandis, 1975; Weeks, Pedersen, & Brislin, 1982). The ideal of such programs is to create parallel or isomorphic patterns of attributions between cultural groups (i.e., accurate perspective taking). These types of cultural assimilators have produced positive outcomes, such as reduced anxiety, increased liking of out-group members, and more ease of interaction, in a variety of settings (Lee & Duenas, 1995; Randolph, Landis, & Tzeng, 1977; Stephan & Stephan, 1984; Triandis, 1976).

Although there has been very limited empirical research within mainstream social psychology examining the influence that emphasizing group differences has on intergroup attitudes, many have argued that this is an important area to explore (see Berry, 1984; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Schofield, 1986; Stephan & Stephan, 1984; Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1981; Van Knippenberg, 1984). For example, Hewstone and Brown (1986) advocate a process of mutual intergroup differentiation, where groups are encouraged to recognize their mutual superiorities and inferiorities and to give equal weight to the characteristics that favor each group. Thus, rather than focusing on the deconstruction of ethnic boundaries, this multicultural approach to ameliorating intergroup prejudices is directed at improving the recognition and appreciation of both similarities and differences between groups.

Intuitively, these two alternative social psychological approaches toward prejudice reduction appear equally important. It is likely that the improvement of interethnic relations will depend on the greater appreciation of group differences (the "multicultural" strategy) and on the treatment of one another as individual members of a common humanity (the "color-blind" or "individuating" strategy). However, one criticism that can be raised against the multicultural approach is that because it accentuates category boundaries, it will inevitably lead to greater prejudice. The social psychological research described previously does indeed demonstrate that simple in-group/out-group categorization is in certain cases sufficient to create intergroup bias (Brewer, 1979; Diehl, 1990; Wilder, 1986).

The major purpose of the research presented in this article was to determine whether drawing category boundaries *necessarily* leads to greater prejudice. The wealth of research directed at overcoming the negative consequences of the categorization process may lead us to assume that if we are to improve intergroup relations, we must avoid thinking about others in terms of their ethnic group memberships. But in contrast, work from a multicultural perspective suggests that recognizing ethnic group memberships (and their associated group characteristics) may lead to more harmonious relations. In this article, we present three experiments that compare the different consequences of presenting White American college students with messages in support of either a color-blind or a multicultural perspective. To facilitate a more naturalistic understanding of how these two prominent perspectives influence perceptions in daily social discourse, the messages were designed to take the form that one might expect from a political speech or argument. In the first two experiments, we examined the effects of a multicultural versus color-blind message on judgments of Whites versus Blacks in general, and in the third

experiment, we examined the effects on predictions about the behavior of White versus Hispanic individuals.

Experiment 1

In this experiment, we were interested in examining the consequences of emphasizing a color-blind versus a multicultural perspective for two well established intergroup phenomena: ethnocentrism (i.e., more positive evaluations of Whites than Blacks; Tajfel, 1969; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the out-group homogeneity effect (i.e., stronger stereotypes of Blacks than Whites; Park & Judd, 1990; Park & Rothbart, 1982). Accordingly, White participants made judgments about Black and White Americans under one of three conditions. In the *color-blind* condition, participants were presented with information supporting the ideal of learning to judge others as individuals and not on the basis of their social group membership. In the *multicultural* condition, participants were presented with information supporting the ideal of learning to recognize and appreciate ethnic diversity. And in the *control* condition, participants were presented with relatively minimal instructions, benignly informing them that we were interested in their perceptions of different social groups.

We made separate predictions for the ways in which the valence and stereotypicality of Whites' intergroup perceptions would differ as a function of the ideological message. Common to both the color-blind and multicultural perspectives is an emphasis on improving interethnic relations—advocates of each approach argue that their path is the best for learning to live more harmoniously. Therefore, on measures of the *valence* of intergroup perceptions (the valence of beliefs as well as general expressed affect), we hypothesized that participants would respond with less ethnocentric judgments in both the multicultural and color-blind conditions than in the control condition. Given the similar emphasis on positivity present in the two ideological contexts, we expected to find no valence differences between the perceptions of color-blind and multicultural participants.

Although both ideological perspectives encourage intergroup harmony, they differ in that the color-blind perspective suggests that this harmony can be best achieved by judging one another as individuals and not on the basis of skin color, while the multicultural perspective underscores the importance of recognizing group differences. Therefore, on a measure of the *stereotypicality* of beliefs, we anticipated that participants presented with a multicultural ideology would express stronger stereotypes of Blacks, relative to Whites (i.e., a stronger out-group homogeneity effect), than would participants in the color-blind and control conditions. Note that we were primarily expecting a strengthening in stereotypes of Blacks because we believe that the multicultural perspective may free participants to express stereotypes about the out-group. Because concerns over stereotyping are less relevant for judgments about the in-group, we did not expect much of a shift in stereotypes about Whites. Thus, our prediction was framed in relative terms. Also, we anticipated no differences between the stereotypes of participants in the color-blind and control conditions, largely because previous research suggests that a norm against stereotyping is already salient in the minds of many young White Americans (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995).

In sum, we expected that encouraging young Whites to adopt a color-blind ideology would result in less ethnocentric perceptions and in stereotypes commensurate with those expressed by participants receiving control instructions. We hypothesized that, relative to the control condition, the multicultural ideology would lead to a *decrease* in ethnocentrism, coupled with an *increase* in stereotyping of Blacks relative to Whites. This prediction for the multicultural condition is contrary to the argument that is often implicit in the individuating approach to improving intergroup relations discussed earlier—that drawing more distinct category boundaries leads to greater intergroup animosity (Tajfel, 1969). We suggest that it may be possible to hold *both* more differentiated and more positive perceptions of the out-group when encouraged to adopt a multicultural perspective.

Method

Participants. One hundred and seventeen White American undergraduates at the University of Colorado participated in the experiment in exchange for partial course credit in their introductory psychology course. Participants completed the experiment in a laboratory room at separate tables, and in a given session anywhere from one to eight individuals worked on the experiment. Completion of the experiment took approximately one hour.

Stimulus materials and procedure. Participation in this experiment involved the completion of a questionnaire that contained the experimental manipulation, the percent estimate task (from which an estimate of out-group homogeneity and ethnocentrism were derived), and the thermometer rating task.

The initial information that participants read served as the manipulation of the ideological context. Participants were randomly assigned to complete the packet under one of the following three conditions: *control* ($n = 37$), *color-blind* ($n = 38$), or *multicultural* ($n = 42$). Participants in the *control* condition were given relatively minimal instructions. They were essentially told that the experimenters were interested in their perceptions of Black and White Americans, and that their responses on the questionnaire would be anonymous.

In both the *color-blind* and the *multicultural* conditions, participants read instructions comparable to those in the control condition, and, in addition, they read a half-page essay, said to be motivated by the consensual opinions held by sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists, regarding issues relevant to ethnic relations in the United States. Participants in both conditions were informed that interethnic issues are of paramount importance in the United States, and that steps need to be taken to resolve existing and potential conflicts between different groups. In the *color-blind* condition, it was suggested that intergroup harmony can be achieved if we recognize that at our core we are all the same, that all men and women are created equal, and that we are first and foremost a nation of individuals. In the *multicultural* condition, it was suggested that intergroup harmony can be achieved if we better appreciate our diversity and recognize and accept each group's positive and negative qualities.

All participants were asked to read the instructions twice and then on the following page to write a half of a page reflecting on their thoughts or feelings about issues of ethnicity in the United States. In the control condition, participants were next instructed to write down five different thoughts, ideas, or reactions that came to mind as they thought about the groups "Blacks" and "Whites" in the United States. In the color-blind and multicultural conditions, participants were next asked to write five reasons why adopting a color-blind perspective (or a multicultural perspective, depending on condition) could potentially strengthen U.S. society.

After finishing with the experimental manipulation, participants completed the percent estimate task. This measure has been used previously to assess the dimensions of stereotypicality and valence present in people's beliefs about different social groups (Judd et al., 1995; Park & Judd, 1990; Park & Rothbart, 1982). In the present task, participants were presented with a list of 56 attributes and were asked to estimate the percentage of White (Black) Americans that possessed each attribute. The attributes used in this experiment included all of the items used by Judd et al. (1995, Experiment 2) and by Wittenbrink, Judd, and Park (1997) in their lexical decision priming task. Half the attributes were stereotypic of Blacks (and counterstereotypic of Whites) and half were stereotypic of Whites (and counterstereotypic of Blacks). In addition, half of each of these were positive and half were negative. The set of attributes used for the percent estimate task is presented in Appendix A. The order of the target groups (Blacks first vs. Whites first) was counterbalanced across participants.

After completing the percent estimates for both target groups, participants completed a "feeling thermometer" for which they were asked to rate 15 groups (including the two target groups of interest) on a 100-point scale on which 0 meant they felt *very coolly* toward the group and 100 meant they felt *very warmly*. Participants were then debriefed and thanked for their involvement in the experiment.

Results

The analyses of the data from this experiment focus on three primary dependent variables. The first is the thermometer ratings, which provide a relatively straightforward affective measure of how warmly participants felt toward the two target groups. The second two measures were both derived from the percent estimate task. The valence measure is the estimated prevalence of positive attributes minus negative attributes for a given target group and so like thermometer is also an evaluative measure, but one based on beliefs about the prevalence of positive and negative characteristics in the group. Finally, the stereotypicality measure is the estimated prevalence of stereotypic minus counterstereotypic attributes and reflects how strong a stereotype the participant holds of each of the groups, with higher numbers reflecting greater perceived stereotypicality. The means for these variables as a function of instruction condition are presented in Table 1, and the target group differences are presented in Table 2.

In Table 2, positive values for *warmth* indicate that Whites were rated more warmly than Blacks on the thermometer task; positive values for *ethnocentrism* indicate that Whites were rated more favorably than Blacks on the traits in the percent estimate task; and positive values for *out-group homogeneity* indicate that Blacks were rated more stereotypically than Whites on the traits in the percent estimate task. Asterisks in Table 2 indicate that a given mean was reliably different from zero at the specified p value.

In Table 2, the mean tendencies toward *out-group* favoritism in ethnocentrism and *reverse* out-group homogeneity on the stereotypicality measure are fairly similar to the results obtained by Judd et al. (1995). Although this pattern is contrary to the expectations of theoretical accounts of intergroup relations, it is consistent with the historical trend toward a reduction in Whites' display of overt prejudice discussed earlier. Our primary concern, however, was with the magnitude of differences in warmth, ethnocentrism, and out-group homogeneity as a function of the ideological message that participants received.

Responses on the warmth measure were examined using a 2 × 3 (Target Group × Condition) analysis of variance. Responses on

Table 1
Warmth, Valence, and Stereotypicality Measures

	Condition			
Measure	Multicultural	Color-blind	Control	Overall M
Warmth				
Black American	64.8	67.8	65.3	65.1
White American	69.6	76.6	79.5	76.3
Valence				
Black American				
Positive (P)	51.3	54.0	53.5	51.7
Negative (N)	34.1	31.1	35.1	33.8
P minus N	17.2	22.9	18.4	17.9
White American				
Positive	51.7	51.2	54.3	52.1
Negative	38.3	36.5	36.9	37.2
P minus N	13.4	14.7	17.4	14.9
Stereotypicality				
Black American				
Stereotypic (S)	46.6	43.4	46.1	45.2
Counterstereotypic (CS)	38.8	41.7	42.5	40.4
S minus CS	7.8	1.7	3.6	4.8
White American				
Stereotypic	50.4	50.1	52.4	50.5
Counterstereotypic	39.6	37.6	38.8	38.8
S minus CS	10.8	12.5	13.6	11.7

Note. Higher values for P minus N reflect more positive perceptions of the group. Higher values for S minus CS reflect more stereotypic perceptions of the group.

the percent estimate task (from which the measures of ethnocentrism and out-group homogeneity were derived) were analyzed using a 2 × 2 × 2 × 3 (Target Group × Attribute Stereotypicality × Attribute Valence × Condition) analysis of variance. The primary effects of interest in the percent estimate ANOVA are the target group by valence interaction (ethnocentrism) and the target group by stereotypicality interaction (out-group homogeneity). For both ANOVAs, two single degree of freedom a priori contrasts were computed for the condition factor, as opposed to simply the 2 df omnibus test for this variable (Abelson & Prentice, 1997; Judd & McClelland, 1989). Because we had different expectations about the ways in which manipulations of the ideological message would affect the valence versus the stereotypicality of participants' intergroup perceptions, the results of our between-condition analyses are discussed in two corresponding sections.

Warmth and ethnocentrism. Analysis of the thermometer measure revealed a reliable main effect of target group such that on average, across condition, participants reported feeling more warmly toward Whites than Blacks, $F(1, 116) = 24.21, p < .001$. The target group by valence interaction was also significant for the valence measure from the percent estimate task, $F(1, 116) = 11.65$, $p < .001$, indicating that on average, across conditions, participants rated Blacks more positively than Whites.

Our primary prediction for condition differences in the valence of participants' beliefs was that presenting either a color-blind or a multicultural message would increase positivity toward the out-group relative to the in-group. Both interethnic ideologies stressed the importance of improving intergroup relations, whereas the control condition made no mention of this. Accordingly, the first single degree of freedom contrast tested for differences between

the multicultural and color-blind versus control conditions. We expected to find an interaction between this contrast and target group. Results confirmed our hypothesis both for warmth, $F(1, 116) = 4.99, p < .03$, and for ethnocentrism, $F(1, 116) = 4.38$, $p < .04$, indicating that participants primed with the ideological messages showed less in-group bias (i.e., a smaller target group difference) than did participants who received control instructions. The second single degree of freedom contrast tested for differences between the multicultural and color-blind conditions. We did not expect to find an interaction of this contrast with target group. Results confirmed that there were no significant differences between the color-blind and multicultural conditions for warmth, $F(1, 116) = 1.93, p = .17$, or for ethnocentrism, $F(1, 116) = 2.17$, $p = .15$.

Out-group homogeneity. Analysis of this measure revealed a reliable target group by stereotypicality interaction, $F(1, 116) = 47.33, p < .001$, indicating that on average, across conditions, participants expressed stronger stereotypes of Whites than Blacks. Our first prediction for condition differences in this measure of stereotypicality was that participants primed with the multicultural perspective would express stronger stereotypes of Blacks, relative to Whites (i.e., a stronger outgroup homogeneity effect), than participants in the color-blind and control conditions. Accordingly, the first single degree of freedom contrast compared participants' average level of out-group homogeneity in the multicultural condition to the average of that in the color-blind and control conditions. Results confirmed our prediction, $F(1, 115) = 10.54, p < .01$, indicating that there was a greater degree of stereotyping of Blacks relative to Whites in the multicultural condition than in the color-blind and control conditions. Importantly, this effect of the multicultural context did not depend on the valence of the attributes being judged, as evidenced by the nonsignificance of the 4-way target group by attribute stereotypicality by attribute valence by condition interaction, $F(1, 115) < 1, ns$. Thus, the multicultural manipulation appeared to increase recognition of both positive and negative characteristics.

The second single degree of freedom contrast tested for differences between the color-blind and control conditions. We expected that the stereotyping of color-blind participants would not differ from that of the control participants, because as previously discussed, prior research suggests that a norm against stereotyping is already operating in the population under study (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Judd et al., 1995). Results indicated that there was in fact no difference between color-blind and control participants

Table 2
Condition Means for Warmth, Ethnocentrism, and Out-Group Homogeneity

	Condition		
Measure	Multicultural	Color-blind	Control
Warmth	4.8	8.8**	14.2***
Ethnocentrism	-3.8	-8.2***	-1.0
Out-group homogeneity	-3.0	-10.8***	-10.0***

$** p < .01.$ $*** p < .001.$

on the measure of out-group homogeneity, $F(1, 115) = 0.11$, $p = .74$.[1]

Discussion

In this experiment we examined how young Whites' interethnic perceptions were influenced by receiving messages promoting different contemporary approaches to thinking about interethnic relations in the U.S., multiculturalism and color blindness. The fact that the participants in the multicultural and color-blind conditions responded with judgments reflecting less in-group positivity (in terms of our measures of warmth and ethnocentrism) suggests that they were sensitive to the first part of the ideological messages—increasing harmony between groups. However, when responding under a framework supporting color blindness, the reduction in in-group positivity was coupled with relatively low levels of expressed stereotypicality of Blacks (similar to that expressed in the control condition); and when responding under a framework supporting multiculturalism, the reduction in in-group positivity was coupled with relatively higher levels of expressed stereotypicality of Blacks. It is also important to note that the relatively greater expression of Black stereotypes displayed by multicultural participants did not depend on the valence of the attributes being judged. Thus, accentuating category boundaries did not focus attention solely on negative out-group characteristics; it also increased the recognition of positive traits. In the second experiment, we further explored the effects that presenting people with a color-blind versus a multicultural perspective has on different types of interethnic perceptions.

Experiment 2

In Experiment 1 we found that presenting participants with a multicultural perspective led to greater stereotyping of Blacks relative to Whites, compared to those who were presented with a color-blind approach. In Experiment 2 we sought to replicate and extend this finding by examining how color-blind versus multicultural participants differentiate between group characteristics on two different tasks: a value sorting task and a stereotype accuracy task.

In the value task, participants indicated the values, or life-guiding principles, that they deemed important in their own lives and in the lives of Black and White Americans in general. In this task, we were interested in the degree of convergence between values assigned to these different targets. First, we anticipated that there would be greater similarity between the values ascribed to White and Black Americans after receiving a message supporting color blindness than after receiving one supporting multiculturalism. This is expected because color blindness advocates a unification of ethnic groups under a common set of American values, whereas multiculturalism advocates recognition of the diversity of values inherent in our society.

We were also interested in how ideology would influence the degree of similarity between the values rated as important to the participant him- or herself and the values ascribed to White and Black Americans. Because the color-blind perspective stresses the commonalities among all people, participants should see their own values as highly similar to those of both Whites and Blacks. Because of its focus on idiosyncrasies, we expected the multicul-

tural ideology to result in value sorts for the self that were less redundant with those of either Whites or Blacks.

In the stereotype accuracy task, we assessed the accuracy of participants' beliefs about Black and White Americans. In Experiment 1, we found that the effect of the multicultural perspective, relative to the color-blind, was to increase the expression of stereotypes about Blacks relative to Whites. This effect might be potentially worrisome if the multicultural approach actually leads to overgeneralized, inaccurate beliefs. In the present experiment, we were interested in whether this shift to endorse a stronger stereotype of Blacks was in the direction of greater *accuracy* or greater *inaccuracy*. We expected that participants in the multicultural condition, relative to those in the color-blind condition, would be more sensitized to the importance of making distinctions among the differential characteristics associated with both Black and White Americans and would therefore more accurately perceive the actual existing differences in the prevalence of stereotypic and counterstereotypic attributes for these groups. In line with results from Experiment 1, we expected that the condition effects on stereotype accuracy would not depend on the valence of the attributes being judged (i.e., multicultural participants should not simply exaggerate the prevalence of negative Black stereotypes and underestimate the prevalence of positive Black stereotypes).

Method

Participants. Eighty-three White American undergraduates at the University of Colorado participated in the experiment in exchange for partial course credit in their introductory psychology course. Participants completed the experiment in a laboratory room at separate study carrels, and in a given session anywhere from one to fourteen individuals worked on the experiment. Completion of the experiment took approximately one hour.

Stimulus materials and procedure. Participation in this experiment involved the completion of a single questionnaire containing the experimental manipulation, the value sorting task, and the stereotype accuracy task.

The initial information that participants read prior to completing the questionnaire served as the experimental manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to complete the questionnaire under one of two conditions: *color-blind* ($n = 42$) or *multicultural* ($n = 41$). The initial instructions for each of these two conditions were identical to those presented to participants in Experiment 1. As in the first experiment, after reading through the ideological message, participants were asked to write about

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[1] Other results from the analysis of the percent estimate task across conditions that were not of primary theoretical importance included a reliable main effect of target group, $F(1, 115) = 10.98$, $p < .001$, indicating that attributes were rated as more prevalent overall for Whites than for Blacks; a reliable main effect of attribute stereotypicality, $F(1, 115) = 253.82$, $p < .001$, indicating that stereotypic attributes were rated as more prevalent than counterstereotypic attributes; a reliable main effect of attribute valence, $F(1, 115) = 287.52$, $p < .001$, indicating that positive attributes were rated as more prevalent than negative attributes; a reliable attribute valence by attribute stereotypicality interaction, $F(1, 115) = 6.25$, $p < .01$, indicating that the difference in ratings between stereotypic and counterstereotypic attributes was greater for positive attributes than for negative attributes; and a reliable target group by attribute valence by attribute stereotypicality triple interaction, $F(1, 115) = 8.78$, $p < .01$, indicating that the tendency to rate Blacks more favorably than Whites was greater on stereotypic attributes than on counterstereotypic attributes.

five reasons why adopting a color-blind perspective (or a multicultural one, depending on condition) could potentially strengthen U.S. society. Then, in an effort to further strengthen the manipulation, participants were presented with a list of 21 reasons that other students had given for why they thought the ideological perspective (either color-blind or multicultural, depending on condition) was valuable. These statements were taken from participants' responses in the first experiment. Participants were asked to circle all of the statements they had considered when they thought about the positive benefits of the given perspective.

Following the experimental manipulation, participants completed the Rokeach (1973) value sort three separate times: once according to their own sentiments and beliefs, once according to how they thought White Americans in general would respond, and once according to how they thought Black Americans in general would respond. This task required participants to rank order two separate sets of values, one consisting of 18 instrumental values and the other consisting of 18 terminal values. Instrumental values essentially reflect different preferred ways of interacting with one's world (e.g., ambitious, broad-minded, courageous), and terminal values reflect desired end states of existence (e.g., an exciting life, a world at peace, social equality). Participants were given two stacks of note cards, each one consisting of 18 alphabetically arranged values, along with a short definition of each value (see Rokeach, 1973). The instrumental values were printed on blue cards and the terminal values were printed on green cards. Participants were instructed to sort through each stack of values and to arrange them in order of their importance and then to record their rank ordering on a list of blanks numbered from 1 to 18, where the *most important* value was recorded in blank 1 and the *least important* value was recorded in blank 18. Participants always completed the sort according to their own sentiments and beliefs first, and the order in which they completed the sorts for Black and White Americans was counterbalanced across participants.

Next, in the stereotype accuracy task, participants were presented with a list of 16 attributes, and were asked to estimate the percentage of African Americans and of Caucasian Americans that they believed possess each attribute. Objective criteria for each of these attributes were obtained via statistics from various government and private sources. As in the percent estimate task from the first experiment, the attributes in this task differed on the dimensions of both stereotypicality and valence, so that for each target group four of the items were stereotypic and positively valenced, four were stereotypic and negatively valenced, four were counterstereotypic and positively valenced, and four were counterstereotypic and negatively valenced. Stereotypic items for Blacks served as counterstereotypic items for Whites and vice versa. The selection of items for this task was based on both our knowledge of the cultural stereotypes of these groups, as well as on participants' responses to the items in the first experiment's percent estimate task. We defined a given item as stereotypic for one target group (and counterstereotypic for the other target group) if its actual value exceeded that for the other target group. For example, one item asked about the percentage of Blacks and Whites who are unemployed. It was included because of the cultural stereotype of Blacks as being "poor" and "lazy" (and the counterstereotype of Whites as such) and because at the time of this experiment Blacks had an unemployment rate of 10.6% and Whites had an unemployment rate of 5.2% (U.S. Department of the Census, 1996). Thus, consistent with the definitions given by Judd and Park (1993), stereotypicality was defined by relative prevalence, and not by whether an attribute was present for greater or less than 50% of the relevant population. The items used in this task are presented in Appendix B. Due to a miswording on the questionnaire, two items had to be deleted from the analysis of this task. As a result, there were only two stereotypic-positive Black items and two counterstereotypic-positive White items, with four in each of the remaining cells. Following completion of the stereotype accuracy task, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

Results

Value sort. In examining responses on the value sort, we first sought to gain some descriptive understanding of the types of values that participants considered important from their own perspective and from the perspectives of White and Black Americans. To do this, we examined the mean rankings for the most important instrumental and terminal values for the "Self," "White Americans," and "Black Americans." These mean rankings represented the averages across all participants within each condition. Most striking were the differences between rankings for the Self and rankings for White Americans. In their own lives, participants valued the cultivation of personal virtues and interpersonal relationships (e.g., broad-minded, loving, courageous, true friendship, inner harmony, family security). In contrast, participants characterized White Americans as placing value on the cultivation of more specific personal skills (e.g., independent, intellectual, capable) and on the acquisition of material rewards (e.g., a comfortable life, a sense of accomplishment, social recognition). This pattern of rankings suggests that, at least to some degree, our White participants may not strongly identify with what they perceive as "White Americans in general."

The values deemed important for Blacks constituted a mixture of concerns relevant to personal growth and interpersonal relationships (e.g., loving, self-respect, family security) and to the cultivation of personal skills and tangible rewards (e.g., capable, ambitious, a comfortable life, social recognition). Notably, participants appeared to perceive that issues relevant to racial oppression are important to Black Americans, as evidenced by their high value rankings for "standing up for one's beliefs" (courageous) and "equal opportunity for all" (equality) in the lives of Blacks.

Next, we examined the relationships between the value rankings for different targets as a function of the ideological condition. We had predicted that there would be a greater congruence between the value rankings for different targets when the importance of color blindness was highlighted than when the importance of multiculturalism was emphasized, because the former stresses sameness, whereas the latter permits differences. To examine these relationships, we first computed six rank order correlations for each participant, corresponding to all possible pairs of rankings [3 types of target pairs (Self-White, Self-Black, and White-Black) $\times$ 2 types of values (instrumental and terminal)]. Each correlation was computed between the rankings generated for a given target pair, across the 18 respective items for a given value type. A Fisher's r-to-z transformation was applied to the correlations for each participant and the mean z in each condition for each of the three types of pairs was computed. The reverse transforms of these mean zs back to rs appear in Table 3.

We first conducted a 2 $\times$ 2 [Condition (color-blind vs. multicultural) $\times$ Value Type (instrumental vs. terminal)] ANOVA in order to examine the correlations between participants' value rankings for White Americans and their value rankings for Black Americans. Consistent with predictions, this analysis revealed a main effect of condition, $F(1, 79) = 5.13, p < .03$, indicating that across value type, the value rankings for Whites were more similar to those for Blacks in the color-blind condition than they were in the multicultural condition. Also present was a marginally reliable main effect of value type, $F(1, 79) = 3.50, p < .07$, indicating that across condition, the rankings for Whites were more similar to those for Blacks on the instrumental values than on the terminal values.

Table 3
Value Sort Rank Order Correlations by Condition

| | Value Rank Correlation | | | | | |
| | Self-White | | Self-Black | | White-Black | |
Condition	Instrumental	Terminal	Instrumental	Terminal	Instrumental	Terminal
Color-blind	.64***	.62***	.66***	.74***	.74***	.61***
Multicultural	.21**	.28*	.35***	.46***	.35***	.31***

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Next, a 2 × 2 × 2 [Condition (color-blind vs. multicultural) × Target Pair (Self-White vs. Self-Black) × Value Type (instrumental vs. terminal)] ANOVA was performed to examine condition differences in the similarity of the self sorts to the two group sorts. Analysis revealed a main effect of condition, $F(1, 79) = 4.88$, $p < .03$, indicating that across value type, the correlations between Self and White rankings and between Self and Black rankings were reliably stronger in the color-blind condition than in the multicultural condition. As can be seen in Table 3, every Self-White and Self-Black correlation in the color-blind condition was greater than the corresponding correlation in the multicultural condition. Thus, participants who received a message advocating color blindness saw their personal values as more similar to those of both White and Black Americans than did those participants who received a message advocating multiculturalism.

Apart from the effects of condition, this second ANOVA also revealed a rather unexpected, though very interesting, main effect of target pair, $F(1, 79) = 4.94$, $p < .03$, indicating that across value type, the relationships between Self and Black rankings were significantly stronger than the relationships between Self and White rankings. In other words, the rank orderings of participants' personal values were more similar to those they ascribed to Blacks than to those they ascribed to Whites. This finding is consistent with the conclusions drawn from the previous descriptive analysis

Table 4
Stereotype Accuracy Task: Criteria and Estimate Discrepancies by Stereotypicality and Valence .

| | Target Group | | | | |
| | Black Americans | | White Americans | | |
Measure	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	M
Criteria					
Stereotypic	68.0	18.3	53.5	46.5	46.5
Counterstereotypic	36.8	20.5	31.5	9.5	24.5
M	52.4	19.4	42.5	28.0	
Color-blind discrepancies					
Stereotypic	−3.3	15.2	4.4	5.0	5.4
Counterstereotypic	8.8	18.9	4.6	17.7	12.5
M	2.3	17.1	4.5	11.4	
Multicultural discrepancies					
Stereotypic	−0.4	15.1	5.9	8.5	7.3
Counterstereotypic	7.9	18.1	−0.5	18.2	10.9
M	3.8	16.6	2.7	13.4	

Note. Entries for the two conditions reflect the estimated minus actual prevalence (i.e., predicted minus criterion values) in that cell.

of the value rankings for the Self and for Whites, namely, that in this task participants may have been expressing their disidentification with what they perceive to be the values held by many Whites in this country. No additional effects were found in the two ANOVAs conducted on the value rankings.[2]

Stereotype accuracy. In the analysis of this task, we were primarily interested in examining participants' level of stereotype accuracy as a function of the ideological message. We anticipated that when primed with a multicultural perspective, participants would more accurately estimate the actual differences in prevalence between stereotypic and counterstereotypic attributes. Following the methodological guidelines for analyzing stereotype accuracy put forth by Judd and Park (1993), discrepancy scores (reflecting the estimated prevalence of the attributes minus the actual prevalence of the attributes) were calculated for each of the 28 attributes (14 for the Black American target group and 14 for the White American target group). The mean criterion values for these attributes, along with the within-condition mean discrepancy scores, are presented in Table 4. The criteria and discrepancy means are broken down by stereotypicality and valence, and the marginals represent means for a given row or column. Looking at the criterion values displayed in Table 4, it is apparent that, on average, the actual prevalence of stereotypic attributes is greater than the actual prevalence of counterstereotypic attributes, and similarly, the actual prevalence of positive attributes is greater than the actual prevalence of negative attributes.[3]

[2] Recall that after completing the value sort for the self, the order in which participants completed the sort for Black Americans versus White Americans was counterbalanced. Inclusion of this order variable in the analysis of variance as a between-subjects factor revealed that (across sort type) participants who performed the sort for Blacks first had self sorts which correlated more highly with the sorts for both of the two target groups ($r = .55$) than did participants who performed the sort for Whites first ($r = .22$), $F(1, 84) = 7.69$, $p = .007$. Additional analyses revealed no significant effects of the order by condition interaction.

[3] Recall that in this task we defined a given item as stereotypic for one target group (and counterstereotypic for the other target group) if its actual value exceeded that for the other target group. Therefore, in examining criterion differences in Table 4, it is important to note that the relevant comparisons are between, for example, Black stereotypic attributes and White counterstereotypic attributes, and vice versa. For example, the items that make up the Black stereotypic-negative criteria ($M = 18.3$) are the same as those that make up the White counterstereotypic-negative criteria ($M = 9.5$), and the difference in the means conforms to our operational definition of stereotypicality.

Discrepancy scores were analyzed using a $2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2$ (Condition × Target Group × Attribute Stereotypicality × Attribute Valence) analysis of variance with repeated measures on the last three factors. At the most general level, this analysis revealed that the grand mean of discrepancy scores was reliably different from zero, $F(1, 81) = 179.56, p < .001$. From Table 4, it is apparent that on average, participants consistently overestimated the prevalence of the attributes; thus, the positive discrepancy scores.

The primary effects of interest from the point of view of assessing stereotype accuracy were the main effect of attribute stereotypicality and the attribute stereotypicality by condition interaction. The former effect would indicate whether the stereotypes expressed by participants of both target groups were overexaggerations or underexaggerations. The latter effect would indicate whether the degree of stereotype accuracy differed depending on the ideological context. Analyses did reveal a reliable main effect of attribute stereotypicality, $F(1, 81) = 57.16, p < .001$, indicating that participants' stereotypes were essentially underexaggerations. That is, they overestimated the prevalence of counterstereotypic attributes more than stereotypic attributes. Another way of phrasing this result is to say that participants saw the target groups on average less stereotypically than they should have, according to the actual criteria.

Results also revealed the predicted attribute stereotypicality by condition interaction, $F(1, 81) = 5.76, p < .02$, indicating that across target groups participants in the multicultural condition more accurately estimated the actual difference in prevalence between stereotypic and counterstereotypic attributes than did participants in the color-blind condition. From Table 4, it is apparent that the multicultural manipulation, relative to the color-blind, led to an increase in estimates of the prevalence of stereotypic attributes and a decrease in estimates of the prevalence of counterstereotypic attributes for both Black and White Americans. Thus, prompting participants to think about intergroup relations in terms of differences between ethnic groups resulted in more accurate appraisals of the differences that do actually exist. Importantly, the increase in stereotype accuracy for participants in the multicultural context did not depend on the valence of the attributes being judged, as evidenced by the nonsignificance of the 4-way target group by attribute stereotypicality by attribute valence by condition interaction, $F(1, 81) < 1, ns$.

Other effects of interest concerned the examination of target group differences in discrepancy scores on the dimensions of stereotypicality and valence (i.e., target group differences in what Judd & Park, 1993, refer to as stereotype inaccuracy and valence inaccuracy). The nonsignificance of the target group by attribute stereotypicality interaction, $F(1, 81) < 1, ns$, indicates that there were no significant differences between target groups in stereotype accuracy. Analyses revealed a main effect of attribute valence, $F(1, 81) = 129.96, p < .001$, indicating that negative attributes were overestimated more than were positive attributes. This main effect was qualified by a reliable target group by attribute valence interaction, $F(1, 81) = 15.84, p < .001$, indicating that in their ratings participants overestimated the relative prevalence of negative to positive attributes more so for Black Americans ($M = 13.6$) than they did for White Americans ($M = 8.7$), in a direction that favored the in-group. Interestingly, this interaction was further qualified by a reliable target group by attribute valence

by condition triple interaction, $F(1, 81) = 4.84, p < .03$. The in-group positivity bias present in the two-way interaction was significantly stronger in the color-blind condition (M overestimate of negative to positive attributes for Blacks $= 14.8$, M overestimate of negative to positive attributes for Whites $= 7.0$) than in the multicultural condition (M overestimate of negative to positive attributes for Blacks $= 12.9$, M overestimate of negative to positive attributes for Whites $= 10.5$). Analysis of the simple effects within condition indicated that the in-group positivity bias was reliable in the color-blind condition, $F(1, 40) = 26.21, p < .001$, but not in the multicultural condition, $F(1, 39) = 1.23, p = .27$. This result supports our argument that increased stereotyping of and increased positive regard for an out-group may theoretically coexist.[4]

Discussion

In this experiment we sought to extend our findings of condition differences in stereotyping from Experiment 1 by examining how these ideological messages influence the manner in which Whites make discriminations between the characteristics of different ethnic groups. Results indicated that the manipulation of ideological perspective clearly had an impact on participants' manner of intergroup differentiation. To review, the values that participants deemed important in the lives of Black versus White Americans differed to a greater extent under a framework supporting multiculturalism than under one supporting color blindness. This finding suggests that influencing people to think in terms of ethnic diversity, as opposed to ethnic similarity, creates the perception that different ethnic groups may have different agendas underlying their social actions. In addition, the values that participants rated as important for themselves differed more from those rated as important for both Black and White Americans in the multicultural condition than in the color-blind condition.

The tendency to perceive different "social realities" for Blacks versus Whites as a function of the ideological message was also evident in the results from the stereotype accuracy task. Participants presented with a multicultural ideology, relative to those presented with a color-blind ideology, more accurately perceived the actual differences in prevalence between stereotypic and counterstereotypic attributes for both Black and White Americans. As in Experiment 1, it is important to emphasize here that the increase in stereotype accuracy for participants in the multicultural context did not depend on the valence of the attributes being judged. The multicultural manipulation resulted in more accurate appraisals about the prevalence of both positive and negative characteristics.

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[4] Other results included a reliable main effect of target group, $F(1, 81) = 12.96, p < .001$, indicating that participants were more accurate in estimating the prevalence of the attributes among White Americans than among Black Americans (i.e., attributes were overestimated to a greater extent for Black Americans than they were for White Americans). Also present was an attribute valence by attribute stereotypicality interaction, $F(1, 81) = 7.97, p < .008$, indicating that the tendency to overestimate negative attributes more than positive attributes was more true for the ratings of counterstereotypic items; and a target group by attribute stereotypicality by attribute valence triple interaction, $F(1, 81) = 179.56, p < .001$, reflecting the fact that the in-group positivity bias present in the target group by valence interaction was much stronger for stereotypic attributes than it was for counterstereotypic attributes.

It is noteworthy that in the stereotype accuracy task the estimates of multicultural participants showed less in-group favoritism than did the estimates of color-blind participants. Although this was an unexpected finding, it does support our contention that an increase in category differentiation can co-occur with a decrease in ethnocentrism. In sum, results from the first two experiments reported here clearly demonstrate that these ideological messages had a significant influence on participants' judgments about Black and White Americans in general. In a third experiment we explored the consequences of being presented with a color-blind versus a multicultural ideology for judgments about individual group members.

Experiment 3

Of particular interest in this experiment was the degree to which predictions about the behavior of targets from different ethnic groups are based on individuating information (the target's past behavior), category information (the target's social category), or some combination of these. Past research investigating what types of information drive behavioral predictions of individuals has produced mixed results. Research by Locksley, Hepburn, and Ortiz (1982; Locksley, Borgida, Brekke, & Hepburn, 1980) suggests that category information can have little or no influence when we form impressions of others so long as some individuating information is present. For example, Locksley et al. (1982) found that although men were perceived as generally more assertive than women, male and female targets described with identical individuating information were predicted to be equally likely to be assertive in a given situation. However, subsequent research has found that increased stereotype strength (i.e., more informative or divergent initial base rate estimates) and increased category activation both lead to a greater utilization of category information over and above individuating information (Beckett & Park, 1995; Krueger & Rothbart, 1988).

In this experiment, Whites made predictions about the behavior of White and Hispanic American individuals after receiving either a color-blind or a multicultural message. In theoretical accounts of the impression formation process, the attention or weight assigned to different types of available information is of fundamental importance (see for example, Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1989; Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1992). We expected that the two ideological perspectives would have significant consequences for judgments of targets by differentially focusing attention on individuating versus category information. Specifically, the color-blind ideology should sensitize participants to the importance of looking beyond skin color and judging one another as individuals. Therefore, we expected those who were primed with this perspective to rely heavily on individuating information and to essentially ignore category information. Such a pattern would be consistent with the Locksley et al. (1980, 1982) results. In contrast, the multicultural ideology should sensitize participants to the importance of recognizing group differences. Therefore, we predicted that those who were presented with the multicultural perspective would rely more heavily on category information than would color-blind perceivers. In Experiment 2, multicultural participants were more accurate in their perceptions of group differences. Here, we anticipate that they may be more accurate in the sense that they

use perceived group differences (i.e., their differential base rate estimates) more in making judgments about individuals.

In addition, we were interested in whether the ideological condition would influence the use of category and individuating information differently as a function of the valence of the behavioral dimension being judged. Therefore, within each of the two conditions, participants judged targets along a dimension that was either stereotypically positive of Hispanics (strong loyalties to their family) or stereotypically negative of Hispanics (lacking ambition). Consistent with findings from the first two experiments, we expected that use of information would not differ as a function of valence. In other words, emphasizing a multicultural perspective should lead participants to make stronger category-based inferences equivalently for the positive Hispanic stereotype (negative White stereotype) and the negative Hispanic stereotype (positive White stereotype).

Method

Participants. One hundred sixty-one White American undergraduates at the University of Colorado participated in the experiment in exchange for partial course credit in their introductory psychology course. Participants completed the experiment in a laboratory room at separate study carrels, and in a given session anywhere from one to ten individuals worked on the experiment. Completion of the experiment took approximately one hour.

Stimulus materials and procedure. Participants were told that this experiment was designed to see whether, given knowledge of a person's previous behavior, they could correctly predict the person's subsequent behavior. They were told that they would read about 24 men who had participated in a research experiment on social decision making, and that each of these individuals had provided us with biographical information about the decisions that they had made in five different situations. Participants assigned to the *positive stereotype* condition (*n* = 97) were informed that in each of these situations, the individuals had to decide whether to behave according to the wishes of their family or according to their own personal desires. Participants assigned to the *negative stereotype* condition (*n* = 64) were informed that in each of these situations, the individuals had to decide whether to behave ambitiously, working and planning for the attainment of future goals, or whether to behave unambitiously, engaging in the minimal effort required for immediate rewards.[5] Participants were told that they would be given information about how each of the 24 individuals behaved in the first four situations (i.e., according to the wishes of their family versus according to their personal desires, or ambitiously versus unambitiously), and that they would be asked to predict how the individuals responded in the fifth situation. They were told that their predictions would be compared to the individuals' actual behavior, and that we were interested in how accurately they could predict targets' behaviors in the fifth situation.

After reading these general instructions, participants read a description of the fifth situation. Below are the descriptions that were provided of the fifth situation, from the positive stereotype and negative stereotype conditions, respectively:

> In this situation, a person has to decide where to accept a job. He has several attractive offers from places all across the country. His family

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[5] The unequal participant numbers in the two stereotype conditions are due to the fact that data for the positive stereotype condition were collected at a different time from data for the negative stereotype condition. The data sets were collected in subsequent semesters, sampling from similar participant populations. Therefore, to offer a more parsimonious account of our findings, we present them as one experiment.

wants him to take the offer closest to home so that they can spend more time together and be close for family gatherings and holiday celebrations. Moving farther from home is attractive because he would be exposed to new people and different ways of life. He can either choose to accept an offer in another part of the country, against the wishes of his family (a personal response), or can choose to accept the offer closest to home, in accordance with the wishes of his family (a family response).

In this situation, a person has to decide whether or not to attend college. By attending college he would put off making money right away and would instead gain a good education and may eventually embark on an exciting and challenging career. Not attending college is attractive because then he could begin making money right away, enabling him to buy a new car and other things. He can either choose to think more into the future and attend college (an ambitious response) or he can think more about the present situation and not attend college (an unambitious response).

Participants were then asked to estimate the probability of the personal response (or ambitious response, depending on condition) in the fifth situation for White American men in general and for Hispanic American men in general. The order of these two questions was counterbalanced across subjects. These ratings were used to obtain a measure of the stereotypes, or base rates, that each participant held concerning the relative levels of personally motivated behavior (or ambitious behavior) among Whites and Hispanics.

Next, participants within each of the two stereotype conditions were randomly assigned to read information that emphasized either a color-blind or a multicultural perspective. In the positive stereotype condition ($n = 97$), 46 participants received the color-blind essay and 51 participants read the multicultural essay. In the negative stereotype condition ($n = 64$), 32 participants read the color-blind essay and 32 participants read the multicultural essay. The content of both ideological manipulations was identical to that used in Experiment 2.

Participants then read descriptions of each of the five situations. Each of these included a description of the personal response and the family response (or the ambitious response and the unambitious response), similar to the descriptions of the fifth situation provided above. The descriptions of the first four situations for each stereotype dimension are presented in Appendix C. After this, participants were presented with descriptions of the 24 target individuals, randomly ordered. In these descriptions participants were provided with the responses of each of the 24 individuals for the first four situations. Of the 16 possible combinations of personal and family (ambitious and unambitious) responses, 12 were used. Each of the 12 combinations of individuating information was paired once with a White target and once with a Hispanic target. Thus, the pattern of individuating information was fully crossed with ethnicity. The ethnicity of the target individual was indicated by a college yearbook photo and by a first and last name. Below is an example of one of the target descriptions:

Carlos Ramirez

(1) Situation #1 Response: Went home to visit his family (Family).
(2) Situation #2 Response: Stopped attending church (Personal).
(3) Situation #3 Response: Chose a different major (Personal).
(4) Situation #4 Response: Stopped dating the woman (Family).

In these descriptions, the target's photo was displayed above the target's name. After reading about each target individual, participants were asked to make a prediction about the target's behavior in the fifth situation. In the positive stereotype condition, participants estimated the probability that a given target would behave according to the wishes of his family or according to his own personal desires, on a scale ranging from 0.0 *certainly a family response*, to 1.00 *certainly a personal response*. In the negative stereotype condition, participants estimated the probability that a given

target would behave ambitiously or unambitiously, on a scale ranging from 0.0 *certainly an unambitious response*, to 1.00 *certainly an ambitious response*. After completing their judgments of the individuals, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

Results

Prior stereotypes. We first examined differences in participants' perceptions about how Whites and Hispanics would behave in the fifth situation. For the positive stereotype condition (i.e., the positive stereotype of Hispanics as having strong family bonds), a t test comparing the ratings for Whites to those for Hispanics showed that this difference was highly reliable, $t(97) = 9.29, p < .001$, indicating that Whites were predicted to behave more according to their own personal desires ($M = .684$) and Hispanics more according to the wishes of their family ($M = .453$).

For the negative stereotype condition (i.e., the negative stereotype of Hispanics as lacking ambition), a t test comparing the ratings for Whites to those for Hispanics showed that this difference was also highly reliable, $t(64) = 10.12, p < .001$, indicating that Whites were predicted to behave more ambitiously ($M = .708$) and Hispanics more unambitiously ($M = .493$). The magnitude of these group differences indicates that participants' prior stereotypes along both the positive and negative dimensions were quite strong. The magnitude of participants' prior stereotypes did not differ as a function of the valence of the stereotype for which they made ratings, $F(1, 160) < 1$, *ns*. Prior stereotypes also did not differ as a function of condition, $F(1, 160) < 1$, *ns*, as was expected, given that these ratings were made before the condition manipulation.

Predictions of individuals. We next examined the predictions of the targets' behavior along the two stereotype dimensions and how these predictions varied as a function of the condition manipulation. Table 5 presents the relevant data. The first column refers to the pattern of individuating information present in a given target description. For example, PPPF denotes a target who made personal decisions in the first three situations, and a family decision in the fourth situation. Similarly, AAAU denotes a target who made ambitious decisions in the first three situations, and an unambitious decision in the fourth situation.

Under the heading for each ideological context, the first two columns display participants' average predictions of the likelihood of personally motivated (or ambitious) behavior in the fifth situation for White and Hispanic targets for each of the personal/family (or ambitious/unambitious) combinations. The third column shows the difference between the judgments for White and Hispanic targets, and the fourth column presents the t value that tests this difference. Note that participants were quite sensitive to the target descriptions. For example, targets described with four personal behaviors were rated as much more likely to behave according to their personal desires in the fifth situation than were targets described with four family behaviors, regardless of the ethnicity of the target individual. This pattern of attention to individuating information was similar for judgments along the ambitious–unambitious dimension. Of interest was whether ethnicity had any effect on the judgments above and beyond the effects due to individuating information and whether the weight given to ethnicity depended on the ideological message that participants received.

Table 5.

Judgments of White and Hispanic Targets by Condition

Target description	Color-blind				Multicultural			
	White target	Hispanic target	W minus H	t^a	White target	Hispanic target	W minus H	t^b
				Positive stereotype				
PPPP	.944	.909	.035	1.84	.916	.870	.047	2.40*
PPPF	.736	.714	.022	1.15	.688	.647	.041	1.78†
FPPP	.715	.697	.017	0.57	.679	.623	.056	1.78†
PPFP	.699	.724	−.025	−1.03	.724	.637	.087	3.57***
FFPP	.505	.524	−.018	−0.72	.509	.488	.021	0.90
PFPF	.502	.516	−.014	−0.43	.504	.450	.057	2.05*
PPFF	.503	.464	.039	1.89	.526	.466	.061	3.38**
FPFP	.493	.496	−.002	−0.11	.515	.516	−.009	−0.03
FFPF	.318	.343	−.025	−1.04	.337	.282	.055	1.84†
FFFP	.285	.351 .	−.066	−2.14*	.324	.326	−.003	−0.12
FPFF	.322	.328	−.006	−0.19	.383	.288	.095	3.18**
FFFF	.073	.079	−.066	−0.35	.157	.079	.077	2.82**
M	.508	.512	−.004	−0.56	.522	.473	.049	5.17***
				Negative stereotype				
AAAA	.886	.883	.003	0.27	.932	.920	.012	2.28*
AAAU	.765	.766	−.001	−0.02	.804	.751	.053	2.57*
UAAA	.663	.633	.030	1.79†	.720	.663	.058	1.70†
AAUA	.751	.763	−.012	−0.60	.799	.787	.012	0.60
UUAA	.492	.520	−.028	−1.23	.517	.456	.061	2.33*
AUAU	.537	.573	−.037	−1.78†	.563	.573	−.010	−0.35
AAUU	.647	.627	.020	1.08	.695	.641	.056	2.32*
UAUA	.627	.639	−.013	−0.49	.644	.639	.005	0.16
UUAU	.430	.374	.057	2.69*	.441	.313	.128	4.44***
UUUA	.413	.403	.009	0.37	.405	.380	.025	1.10
UAUU	.398	.384	.014	0.86	.409	.323	.086	2.70*
UUUU	.291	.286	.005	0.35	.202	.156	.045	1.46
M	.575	.571	.004	0.49	.594	.550	.044	5.30***

Note. Values could range from .00 to 1.00. Higher numbers in the case of the positive stereotype indicate greater likelihood of a personal decision. P = personal response; F = family response; W minus H = White minus Hispanic. Higher numbers in the case of the negative stereotype indicate greater likelihood of an ambitious response. A = ambitious response; U = unambitious response.
[a] df = 46 for the positive stereotype, and 32 for the negative stereotype. [b] df = 51 for the positive stereotype, and 32 for the negative stereotype.
† $p < .10$ (marginally significant). * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Looking at the pattern of judgments in Table 5, it is apparent that differences in predicted behavior in the fifth situation for White versus Hispanic targets fluctuated considerably from one ideological condition to the other. In the color-blind condition, judgments for White versus Hispanic targets differed significantly for only two combinations of individuating information, FFFP and UUAU. Note that the average difference between judgments of the FFFP target was in a counterstereotypic direction, with the White target judged as *less* likely to engage in personally motivated behavior than the Hispanic target. In contrast, the judgments of participants in the multicultural condition differed substantially as a function of ethnicity. For over half of the 12 combinations of individuating information, participants displayed a significant tendency to judge targets stereotypically, with White targets judged as more likely to engage in personally motivated behavior (or more likely to engage in ambitious behavior) than Hispanic targets.

To more clearly examine differences in judgments due to ethnicity as a function of ideological condition, we aggregated the judgments across all 12 targets. The mean judgments across targets by stereotype dimension and ideological condition are presented at the bottom of each column of targets in Table 5. In the color-blind

condition, White targets were not judged as any more likely to make personal decisions than Hispanic targets, $t(46) = -0.56, p = .58$; nor were White targets judged as any more likely to engage in ambitious behavior than Hispanic targets, $t(32) = 0.49, p = .63$. Collapsing across stereotype dimension, a test of the difference in estimates between White and Hispanic targets across all 12 target cases revealed no effect due to ethnicity in the color-blind condition, $t(78) = -0.16, p = .87$. This result supports our prediction that being presented with a color-blind perspective causes one to ignore social categories in making judgments.

In contrast, participants presented with a multicultural ideology displayed a reliable tendency to use ethnicity in their predictions of targets' behavior. This tendency to use ethnicity was present in participants' predictions of targets' behavior on both stereotype dimensions. In the multicultural condition, White targets were judged as more likely to make personal decisions than Hispanic targets, $t(51) = 5.17, p < .001$, and more likely to engage in ambitious behavior than Hispanic targets, $t(32) = 5.30, p < .001$. Collapsing across stereotype dimension, a test of the difference in estimates between White and Hispanic targets across all 12 target cases revealed a reliable effect due to ethnicity in the multicultural

condition in the stereotypic direction, $t(83) = 7.07$, $p < .001$, supporting our prediction that the multicultural perspective encourages one to use ethnicity as a valid basis for making social judgments.

Thus, in the multicultural condition, across the 12 patterns of individuating information, Whites were seen as more likely to engage in personally motivated behavior and more likely to engage in ambitious behavior than Hispanics, indicating that ethnicity contributed to the predictions over and above the individuating information. No such difference was obtained in the color-blind condition. Collapsing across stereotype dimension, results indicated that this tendency to use ethnicity in the multicultural condition was significantly greater than in the color-blind condition, as revealed by a highly reliable interaction between target ethnicity and ideological condition, $F(1, 160) = 30.36$, $p < .001$. These results are consistent with our expectation that the manipulation of ideological perspective could lead to category effects on participants' judgments.

Regression analysis. We also performed regression analyses to examine participants' use of category and individuating information. In this approach, separate regressions were performed to estimate the regression weights for each participant for ethnicity and for the individuating information (Hursch, Hammond, & Hursch, 1964). The predicted likelihood of engaging in personally motivated (or ambitious) behavior in the fifth situation was the dependent variable, using the 24 case descriptions as the unit of analysis. For each participant, then, the predicted behavior for each of the 24 case descriptions was regressed onto ethnicity and behavior in each of the first four situations (personal versus family, or ambitious versus unambitious), first contrast coding all of the independent variables. This resulted in five parameter estimates for each subject that indicated how heavily ethnicity and each of the four bits of behavioral information were weighted by that participant in making predictions in the fifth situation. We then examined the magnitude of these parameter estimates (first computing the mean for each participant of the parameter estimates from the four situations) on average across participants and as a function of both stereotype dimension (positive versus negative) and ideological condition (color-blind versus multicultural). The mean regression coefficients are presented in Table 6.

First, we examined the magnitude of the coefficients for the individuating information. Analysis revealed that across all subjects the average of the four individuating information coefficients was reliably different from zero, $t(160) = 39.78$, $p < .001$, indicating that the individuating information was weighted quite heavily in making predictions about the behavior of targets, as

Table 6
Mean Regression Weights for Ethnicity and Individuating Information

	Ethnicity		Individuating information	
Condition	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
Color-blind	−.002	.002	.102***	.077***
Multicultural	.025***	.022***	.092***	.092***

*** $p < .001$.

should be evident from the variability in target ratings observed in Table 5.

Our expectations regarding the effects of ideological condition were that participants presented with a color-blind perspective and its emphasis on judging one another as individuals would weight individuating information quite heavily. This was certainly the case, as can be seen from the mean weights for color-blind participants presented in Table 6. They showed a highly reliable tendency to weight individuating information on both the positive and negative stereotype dimensions. We made no firm predictions about the effects of a multicultural perspective on attention to individuating information. However, one concern that can be raised against a multicultural approach is that in its emphasis on cultural differences it may cause perceivers to ignore important information about the individual, information that would be attended to in a color-blind approach. Referring again to the means in Table 6, it is apparent that multicultural perceivers did not in fact ignore individuating information. Participants presented with a multicultural perspective showed a highly reliable tendency to weight individuating information on both the positive and negative stereotype dimensions. Collapsing across stereotype dimension, participants presented with a multicultural perspective assigned no less weight to the individuating information (M regression weight for the four bits of individuating information = .092) than did participants presented with a color-blind perspective ($M = .092$), $F(1, 159) < 1$, *ns*.

Other results revealed a main effect of stereotype valence on the use of individuating information, $F(1, 160) = 6.79$, $p < .01$, indicating that across ideological condition individuating information was weighted more heavily for judgments of targets along the positive stereotype dimension than along the negative stereotype dimension. From Table 6, it is apparent that this effect is due to an asymmetry in the use of individuating information by color-blind participants, who weighted individuating information more heavily when judging targets along the positive dimension than along the negative dimension. The main effect of stereotype valence on the use of individuating information was in fact qualified by a reliable interaction between stereotype valence and ideological condition, $F(1, 159) = 5.63$, $p < .02$.

Next, we examined the magnitude of the coefficients for ethnicity. Our predictions were that participants presented with a multicultural perspective and its emphasis on recognizing and appreciating group differences would use information about ethnicity in making predictions about targets' behavior. In Table 6, one can see that multicultural participants did indeed display a reliable tendency to use ethnicity for both stereotype dimensions. In contrast, we expected that participants presented with a color-blind perspective and its emphasis on the importance of looking beyond skin color should essentially ignore ethnicity, rejecting it as an invalid basis for judgment. Again referring to Table 6, it is apparent that color-blind participants did not show a reliable tendency to use ethnicity for judgments along either stereotype dimension. As indicated by the main effect of ethnicity, participants primed with a multicultural perspective assigned more weight to ethnicity (M regression weight for ethnicity = .024) than did participants primed with a color-blind perspective ($M = −.004$), $F(1, 159) = 28.43$, $p < .001$.

There was also a marginally reliable interaction between stereotype valence and ideological condition, $F(1, 159) = 3.45$, $p < .09$,

for the ethnicity coefficients. From the mean weights in Table 6, it appears that color-blind participants weighted ethnicity in a more stereotypic direction for the negative than positive stereotype, whereas multicultural participants weighted ethnicity in the more stereotypic direction for the positive than negative stereotype. One concern that can be raised against a multicultural approach is that in its emphasis on cultural differences it may cause perceivers to overemphasize negative stereotypes about various out-groups. Our results indicate that this was not the case, given the pattern reflected in the stereotype valence by ideological condition interaction.

Discussion

Taken together, these findings suggest that participants in both conditions relied heavily on the case-specific individuating information. In addition, participants in the multicultural condition continued to use the ethnicity of the targets (i.e., assigned it a nonzero weight) as well, whereas ethnicity was essentially ignored in the color-blind condition. These results are consistent with our predictions that being presented with a color-blind perspective would lead one to ignore category information and instead judge others as individuals, and that being presented with a multicultural perspective would lead to a significant reliance on category information. Importantly, the use of categorical information by multicultural participants was not restricted to the negative out-group stereotype. From a normative perspective, the behavior of participants in the multicultural condition (specifically, their use of base rate as well as individuating information) is more accurate, or correct, than that of participants in the color-blind condition. In sum, results from this experiment suggest that the ideological perspective one adopts can have a substantial influence on the inferences we make about the social behavior of others.

General Discussion

Recognition of increasing ethnic diversity within the United States has led to fierce ideological debate over how to best achieve intergroup harmony. Proponents of a color-blind perspective focus on the importance of uniting a nation of individuals under a common set of democratic principles. In contrast, advocates of a multicultural perspective focus on the importance of uniting a nation of diverse ethnic groups under a framework that recognizes and appreciates cultural differences. The tension between these two approaches is mirrored in the social psychological study of intergroup relations. In this article, we examined the influence that these two ideological approaches have on young Whites' social judgments about both groups and individuals.

Results from the three experiments presented here clearly demonstrate that ideological messages had significant effects on judgments about Black, Hispanic, and White Americans. In the first experiment, we examined the influence of a color-blind versus multicultural perspective on Whites' expression of their general affective reactions towards Blacks versus Whites, as well as on the valence and stereotypicality of their beliefs about both of these groups. Participants in both the color-blind and multicultural conditions responded with judgments reflecting less in-group positivity (in terms of our measures of warmth and ethnocentrism). This suggests that motivating people to think about the importance of

improving interethnic relations (through either a color-blind or a multicultural perspective) can have the effect of producing, at least on a temporary basis, less prejudiced interethnic attitudes. Importantly though, for participants responding under a framework advocating a color-blind ideal, the reduced valence bias was paired with a pattern of intergroup stereotyping similar to that observed in our control condition (i.e., a reluctance to express a stereotype of Blacks), whereas for participants responding under a framework advocating a multicultural ideal, the reduced valence bias was paired with the relatively stronger expression of stereotypes of Blacks relative to Whites (i.e., a more commensurate level of stereotyping for both groups). The observed effects of the multicultural manipulation point to an especially interesting consideration, namely, that increased stereotyping of and increased positive regard for an ethnic out-group are not necessarily mutually exclusive phenomena; they can coexist.

Extending these findings in Experiment 2, we found that presenting participants with a message advocating multiculturalism versus color blindness resulted in more differentiated perceptions of Black and White Americans. Specifically, responding from a multicultural perspective, as opposed to a color-blind perspective, caused participants to more accurately estimate the actual differences in prevalence between stereotypic and counterstereotypic attributes for Black and White Americans. This finding parallels that of Experiment 1 (i.e., greater stereotyping of Blacks in the multicultural condition, relative to the color-blind and control conditions, on both positive and negative attributes) and suggests that the change due to the multicultural manipulation to endorse a stronger stereotype is in the direction of more *accurately* perceiving the different characteristics (i.e., different stereotypes) associated with the two target groups. It is also noteworthy that in the stereotype accuracy task the estimates of multicultural participants showed less in-group favoritism than did the estimates of color-blind participants. In addition, results from the second experiment indicated that responding from a multicultural perspective, as opposed to a color-blind perspective, caused participants to perceive greater dissimilarity between the values, or life-guiding principles held by Black Americans and those held by White Americans. This suggests that the effects of presenting a multicultural ideal are not limited to altering the expression of cultural stereotypes and that adopting such an ideology also results in more discriminating perceptions of the different social realities thought to be experienced by Black versus White Americans.

Finally, findings from our third experiment indicated that these ideological perspectives can also have consequences for social judgments about individuals. The type of information participants used in predicting the behavior of Hispanic and White targets depended to a significant extent on the framework they were encouraged to adopt. Advocating a color-blind perspective led participants to ignore category information and to instead judge others as individuals, while advocating a multicultural perspective led to a significant reliance on both ethnicity and individuating information.

Although our findings should not be interpreted as indicative of the types of attitudes and beliefs possessed by people who actually adopt these perspectives, the results do demonstrate the power that cohesive ideological messages can have in shaping people's perceptions. We find it somewhat remarkable that the effects of our manipulations were so substantial and consistent. It appears that

participants were willing to agree with whichever perspective they were given, despite the fact that the messages contrasted rather sharply. One might contend that the majority of our effects were simply driven by experimenter demand characteristics. However, we argue against the triviality implied by such an interpretation primarily because absolutely nothing in the ideological messages we presented to participants explicitly instructed them to judge ethnic groups (or ethnic group members) in a particular fashion. The color-blind and multicultural essays simply offered interpretations of interethnic relations in the United States and were written in relatively abstract language of the sort that one might find in a common political speech or argument. Therefore, we strongly believe that our results offer a fairly naturalistic approximation of how young Whites may respond to such messages that they inevitably encounter in their daily social experience. In retrospect, many young Whites may simply have poorly developed frameworks for thinking about ethnic diversity and therefore may easily be persuaded to adopt whatever perspective coherently presents itself.

We believe that the observed effects of presenting participants with a multicultural perspective are the most interesting and important aspects of the research presented here. The multicultural framework led to stronger stereotypes, greater accuracy in these stereotypes, and more normative use of category information in judgments of individuals. Across all three experiments, this increase in category differentiation occurred both for attributes that favored the in-group and for attributes that favored the out-group. In addition, increased category differentiation was paired with greater overall positivity toward the out-group (Experiments 1 and 2) and considerable attention to individuating information (Experiment 3).

These findings must lead us to question the implicit assumption driving the majority of social psychological efforts aimed at prejudice reduction: that the in-group/out-group categorization process leads to prejudice, and that efforts aimed at bias reduction must therefore de-emphasize the relevance of social categories. Certainly, we agree that the simple process of categorization is necessary for the occurrence of prejudice. Otherwise, there would be no basis for assigning differential group evaluations. However, the research presented in this article suggests that the particular relevance of social categories within a given ideological framework makes all the difference for subsequent intergroup evaluations. When operating under a color-blind set of assumptions, social categories are viewed as negative information to be avoided, or suppressed. The stubborn overreliance on negative stereotypes is considered to inhibit more equal interactions as individuals. In contrast, when operating under a multicultural set of assumptions, social categories are viewed as simply a consequence of cultural diversity. Failing to recognize and appreciate group similarities and differences is considered to inhibit more harmonious interactions between people from different backgrounds. The present findings highlight the fact that increased differentiation of the out-group from the in-group (i.e., increased stereotyping) and reduced ethnocentrism are not necessarily mutually exclusive phenomena.

By no means do we intend to undermine past efforts that approach the issue of prejudice reduction from a color-blind or an individuating perspective. This path has yielded numerous insights about the cognitive processes underlying intergroup relations. We

simply wish to argue that *emphasizing* social category differences may also lead to greater positivity toward the out-group when this emphasis is grounded in a multicultural framework that values these group differences, both positive and negative.

In considering issues relevant to social intervention, we believe it is unproductive to argue that a multicultural approach is more valid or beneficial than a color-blind approach. It seems likely that improved interethnic relations will depend both on the greater appreciation of group differences and on the treatment of one another as individual members of a common humanity. To date however, social psychological efforts aimed at prejudice reduction have focused far more on individuation than on mutual intergroup differentiation. Therefore, we share the opinions of a number of researchers who have ventured beyond a strictly individuating approach and who recognize that improving interethnic relations will ultimately require new modes of perception, characterized by fluid, flexible, and cooperative modes of relating to one another as unique individuals *and* as members of cultural subgroups *and* as constituents of a common humanity (e.g., Brewer, 1996; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998; Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1994, 1996; Marcus-Newhall, Miller, Holtz, & Brewer, 1993).

In this article, we believe that our focus on *both* multicultural and color-blind perspectives is consistent with the need for a balanced approach to examining interethnic relations. Our view resembles that of Yinger (1994) and those of social psychological researchers who have argued that the most beneficial alternative for all parties involved is ultimately one in which we strive towards *integration* (Berry, 1984) or *additive multiculturalism* (Triandis, 1988). Our interpretation of this perspective consists of two basic parts: (a) that the maintenance of ethnic and cultural identity is important both for people's psychological health, as well as for the future adaptability and creativity of the human species in a rapidly changing social and physical environment, and (b) that there is an urgent need for common ground upon which all groups may realize that as human beings we are more similar to one another than we are different, and that by agreeing on a common set of operating procedures, we can live a cooperative existence. The path toward achieving this integrative solution is something that we all must struggle with, both in our research and in our daily social experience. We hope that the research presented in this article raises awareness about the need to examine the ideological foundations of intergroup relations, and that it provides insight into how color-blind and multicultural frameworks influence social judgment.

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(Appendix follows)

Appendix A

Percent Estimate Task Attributes: Experiment 1

Positive	Negative
Black stereotypic (White counterstereotypic)	
streetwise	poor
emotionally expressive	superstitious
playful	lazy
sensitive	promiscuous
humorous	reckless
fashionable	dishonest
religious	violent
merry	dangerous
cheerful	threatening
charming	shiftless
athletic	ignorant
musical	complaining
"I would enjoy singing in a church choir."	"I've had a lot of run-ins with the police."
"I grew up close to my cousins, aunts, and uncles."	"I just can't seem to keep a job for very long."
White stereotypic (Black counterstereotypic)	
organized	boring
wealthy	materialistic
sheltered	greedy
ethical	conventional
responsible	selfish
independent	exploitative
progressive	uptight
industrious	callous
successful	stubborn
ambitious	boastful
educated	competitive
intelligent	stuffy
"If you want to get ahead, you have to take charge."	"I believe my job is more important than my family."
"A kid growing up in the U.S. has unlimited opportunities."	"I have usually been given whatever material things I needed or wanted without having to work for them."

Appendix B

Stereotype Accuracy Task Items and Criteria: Experiment 2

	Criteria	
	Black Americans	White Americans
Black stereotypic (White counterstereotypic)		
Positive		
What percentage in each group would answer yes to the question "Have you attended a religious worship service at least once in the past seven days?"[a]	57	43
Think about all the basketball players in the National Basketball Association. What percentage of these do you think are:[b]	79	20
Negative		
What percentage in each group are unemployed?[c]	11	5
What percentage of women in each group who give birth are teenagers?[c]	23	11
What percentage of households in each group make under $10,000 a year?[c]	29	12
What percentage in each group are divorced?[c]	11	9
White stereotypic (Black counterstereotypic)		
Positive		
What is the average overall ACT score for each group?[d]	14	19
What percentage of households in each group make over $50,000 a year?[c]	14	30
Considering people 25 years and older, what percentage in each group have at least a high school diploma?[c]	63	78
What is the average SAT-math score for each group?[d]	388	495
Negative		
Think about all the people in the U.S. who are arrested for tax fraud. What percentage of these do you think are:[c]	5	93
What percentage in each group smoke cigarettes on a regular basis?[e]	34	38
What percentage of each group say they have had 5 or more drinks on one day in the past year?[e]	29	38
What percentage in each group report being less physically active than their peer group?[e]	14	17

Criteria for the stereotype accuracy items were obtained from the following sources: [a] Horton and Smith (1990). [b] National Basketball Association (1996). [c] U.S. Bureau of the Census (1996). [d] U.S. Department of Education (1996). [e] U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1993).

Appendix C

Individuating Information Situations: Experiment 3

Positive Hispanic Stereotype

1. In this situation, a person has to decide how to spend a week-long vacation that is coming up. He has to decide between either traveling to a beach resort or going home to visit relatives, one of whom is celebrating a birthday. His family wants him to come home for vacation so that all the close relatives can be together for the celebration. Traveling to the beach resort is attractive because he can leave responsibilities behind and have fun making new acquaintances. He can either choose to spend the vacation at the beach resort, against the wishes of his family (a personal response), or can choose to spend the vacation visiting relatives back home and celebrating the birthday, in accordance with the wishes of his family (a family response).

2. In this situation, a person has to decide whether or not to continue attending church services after moving out of his parent's house after high school. His family wants him to continue to attend church because they feel it is a very important part of life. Not continuing to attend church is attractive because it might free up his time for other pursuits, such as engaging in new kinds of activities and meeting new kinds of people. He can either stop attending church, against the wishes of his family (a personal response), or can choose to continue attending church, in accordance with the wishes of his family (a family response).

3. In this situation, a person has to decide what to choose as his college major. He is confronted with two different options. His family wants him to follow family tradition and to choose the major that his father was educated in (or wanted to be educated in). Choosing a different major is attractive because he could break away from family tradition and have a unique and different career. He can either choose a different major, against the wishes of his family (a personal response), or can choose the major that his father was educated in (or wanted to be educated in), in accordance with the wishes of his family (a family response).

4. In this situation, a person has to decide whether or not to continue dating a certain woman. His family wants him to stop dating this woman because they would like him to find someone who is of a more similar background. Continuing to date the woman is attractive because it would allow him to become close to a different kind of person. He can either choose to continue dating this woman, against the wishes of his family (a personal response), or can choose to stop dating this woman, in accordance with the wishes of his family (a family response).

Negative Hispanic Stereotype

1. In this situation, a person has to decide how to spend a week-long vacation that is coming up. He can either plan a backpacking trip to

a place he has never been before or he can spend the vacation just hanging around the house and taking it easy. Going on the backpacking trip would take a lot of effort and careful planning, but it would also be rewarding in terms of the new and exciting experiences he would have. Spending the vacation hanging around the house, relaxing and watching T.V., would not take a lot of planning and would allow him to just relax and not have to think about too much. He can either choose to plan for and then go on the backpacking trip to the place he has never been (an ambitious response), or he can spend the vacation relaxing around home (an unambitious response).

2. In this situation, a person has to decide whether or not to take on additional responsibilities in his job. He has two options. Choosing the option of taking on the new responsibilities will take a lot of ambition—it will demand a lot of his time and energy, but will be very rewarding both financially and in terms of the additional skills he will learn. The other option, continuing to perform the routine duties of his present job, will not be as rewarding, but will also not take a lot of ambition—it will be less demanding in terms of time and energy and will allow him to take it easy without having to worry about learning too much new information or taking on additional stress. He can either choose to take on the additional responsibilities (an ambitious response), or he can choose to take it easy and not worry about the additional responsibilities (an unambitious response).

3. In this situation, a person has to decide whether or not to remodel his house. Remodeling the house will take a lot of his extra effort and planning because the house could use a lot of improvements, but it will also make living in the house much more comfortable in the long run. Choosing not to remodel the house will be easier in the short-term because he won't need to spend his extra time on the project, but remodeling would increase the value of the house in the future. He can either think about the future benefits of a nicer home and choose to remodel the house (an ambitious response), or he can think about the immediate benefits of not having to spend extra time on the project and choose not to remodel the house (an unambitious response).

4. In this situation, a person has to decide whether or not to take a course being offered at the local recreation center (a course related to physical fitness). Taking the course would involve a lot of effort and would take up a lot of his free time on the weekdays, but would also be very rewarding because it would allow him to learn new skills, get in shape, and avoid health problems in the future. Not taking the course would not help him learn any new skills or get in shape, but this decision would also leave his weekday nights free to just take it easy. He can either choose to take the course (an ambitious response), or he can choose to leave his weekday nights free (an unambitious response).